This result could be read as a rising comfort level with the current administration’s increased economic engagement with mainland China. But this would be to miss the point.
The survey regularly receives media attention because the self-identification indicator is used as a roundabout way of gauging public attitudes toward mainland China. The assumption is that those who identify themselves exclusively as Taiwanese lean toward an independence platform, while those who identify themselves as Chinese or Chinese and Taiwanese are more likely to favor engagement strategies and even a possible political settlement with Beijing.
The study, in other words, creates a false choice between the respondents’ cultural and ethnic heritage and their political views on Taiwan’s unresolved relationship with mainland China.
This did not happen by accident. When the Democratic Progressive Party won the presidency in 2000, it unleashed long simmering resentments and the communal pride of formerly disenfranchised voters. Once in office, the DPP engaged on a bold experiment to localize Taiwanese culture, thereby creating the impression of a cultural split from the mainland that would reflect the party’s aspiration for a permanent political separation.
Some aspects of this new cultural policy were beneficial. For example, the Taiwanese dialect, once suppressed by the government, was celebrated and became more commonly used in public life. This was long overdue, since the majority of people in Taiwan speak the dialect in daily life.
Yet, the political implications were more troubling. The DPP attempted to color the Kuomintang, which had ruled Taiwan from 1945 to 2000, as an alien regime. It was a party, they argued, supported only by the Chinese immigrants who arrived in Taiwan in 1949. This group of later Chinese immigrants, the “waisheng ren” or “people of outside provinces,” found themselves characterized as loyal to mainland China and at heart not Taiwanese at all.
While it is true that the KMT once held aspirations of returning to China, it later abandoned the idea of ruling the mainland. And according to KMT policy, unification with the mainland could occur only after Beijing abandoned authoritarian rule and adopted democratic governance. Even then it would act only in accordance with the wishes of the people of Taiwan.
There was also a demographic problem with the DPP’s characterization of the KMT as an “alien regime.” The “waisheng ren” accounted for only about 14 percent of Taiwan’s population. Yet, the party consistently won a majority of seats in Taiwan’s legislature. The math indicates that the majority of KMT voters belong to the “bensheng ren,” the same group from which the DPP derives its support.
The term “bensheng ren” is often translated incorrectly into English as “native Taiwanese,” leading to the false impression that this group originated in Taiwan. A more accurate translation would be “the people of this province.” The so-called “native Taiwanese” are in fact just earlier immigrants from China.
Regardless of these facts, the strategy of stirring up mistrust between these groups proved especially effective at election time, when the DPP repeatedly drew votes by questioning the KMT’s allegiance to Taiwan and characterizing it as a pro-China political party.
Only in 2008, when the KMT secured the presidency once again with a majority of votes from “bensheng ren” did this line of reasoning fade into the obscurity where it belongs.
The latest RDEC survey contains one statistic that is particularly revealing. Nearly 60 percent of respondents indicated that they believed political parties manipulated these identity issues for political advantage.
Taiwan is in fact a remarkably homogenous country when it comes to ethnic identity. It is 98- percent Han Chinese, with a 2- percent minority of aborigines.
The results of public polling are always determined to some degree by the nature of the questions. The RDEC survey might better reveal the actual situation in Taiwan if it asked if people were proud of the remarkable economic, political and social achievements of Taiwan.
The survey would also reveal a resounding consensus if it asked different questions: Are your ancestors from China? Is your political allegiance to Taiwan or mainland China? Is it possible to be proud of your ethnic Chinese heritage and support Taiwan over mainland China? If you are politically loyal to the government in Taipei, can you favor expanding economic cooperation with mainland China?
Separating the present political situation from questions of ethnic heritage would steer the debate back to more relevant issues and would reveal a level of consensus in Taiwan that is distorted by false identity choices.
—Robert Green is a regular contributor to Economist Intelligence Unit publications on Taiwan. These views are the author’s and not necessarily those of “Taiwan Today.”
Copyright © 2009 by Robert Green
write to ttonline@mail.gio.gov.tw